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In the lead-up to the
U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, the George W. Bush administration ªxated on
the perceived threat from Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and
Saddam Hussein’s links to international terrorism.1 After the overthrow of the
Baathist regime, when the U.S. military position deteriorated, President Bush
was extremely reluctant to accept a loss and instead pursued an escalatory
strategy known as the “surge” by committing tens of thousands of additional
troops. Following the withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from Iraq in 2011, the
intervention was widely remembered as a costly failure, and the desire to
avoid a repeat experience became a major source of learning, leading to, for ex-
ample, the Obama doctrine.2 Strikingly, as the Iraq War evolved from prospec-
tive operation, to current endeavor, to past adventure, bad information always
loomed large. Leaders inºated the threat posed by Iraq, escalated the inter-
vention rather than accept a loss, and then resolved never to repeat the
same mistake.
The example of Iraq reºects a wider puzzle in international relations in
which negative phenomena have stronger effects on judgment and decision-
making than do positive phenomena. Here, “negative phenomena” refers to
information, events, or beliefs with the potential to cause undesirable or bad
outcomes (e.g., encountering threats, losing resources, suffering military de-
Dominic D.P. Johnson is the Alastair Buchan Professor of International Relations at the University of
Oxford. Dominic Tierney is an associate professor of political science at Swarthmore College, a senior fellow
at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, and a contributing editor at The Atlantic.
The authors thank Bree Bang-Jensen, Roy Baumeister, Richard Betts, Mathias Frendem, John
Hibbing, Jonathan Mercer, Tonya Putnam, John Tierney, Marc Trachtenberg, Benjamin Valentino,
and William Wohlforth for valuable feedback, as well as participants in research seminars at
Columbia University, Dartmouth College, the University of Oxford, and the University of Wash-
ington. The authors are also grateful to the anonymous reviewers for exceptionally helpful
comments.
1. David A. Lake, “Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory: Assessing Rationalist Explanations of the
Iraq War,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Winter 2010/11), pp. 7–52, at p. 9, doi.org/10.1162/
ISEC_a_00029. See also Chaim Kaufmann, “Threat Inºation and the Failure of the Marketplace of
Ideas: The Selling of the Iraq War,” International Security, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Summer 2004), pp. 5–48,
doi.org/10.1162/0162288041762940.
2. Dominic Tierney, “The Obama Doctrine and the Lessons of Iraq,” FPRI E-Note (Philadelphia:
Foreign Policy Research Institute, May 27, 2012), http://www.fpri.org/article/2012/05/the-
obama-doctrine-and-the-lessons-of-iraq/.
International Security, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Winter 2018/19), pp. 96–140, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00336
© 2019 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Bad World
Bad World Dominic D.P. Johnson
and
Dominic TierneyThe Negativity Bias in International
Politics
96
feats, or gaining enemies). “Positive phenomena” refers to factors with the po-
tential to cause desirable or good outcomes (e.g., encountering opportunities,
accumulating wealth, achieving military victories, or gaining allies). Put sim-
ply, bad news consistently exerts a more powerful inºuence on thinking and
behavior than does good news. For example, states focus on threats more than
on opportunities, dwell on losses more than on gains, and learn more from
past failures than from successes.
Why would positive and negative events have an asymmetric inºuence on
perception and behavior? After all, from a rationalist perspective, both good
information and bad information are important in weighing the costs and
beneªts of different courses of action. A compelling explanation of their asym-
metric inºuence lies in the “negativity bias.” Psychologists have discovered
a fundamental principle of human cognition, in which negative factors have a
greater impact than positive factors across a wide range of psychological phe-
nomena, including motivation, emotion, information processing, decision-
making, learning, and memory. Crucially, this is not a strategy that people
choose to maximize utility. Instead, the negativity bias is a subconscious pre-
disposition that humans exhibit whether or not they are aware of it.3
This argument is important for three reasons. First, the negativity bias helps
explain many critical behaviors in international relations, including the secu-
rity dilemma, threat inºation, the outbreak and persistence of war, loss aver-
sion, the neglect of opportunities for cooperation, and the prominence of
failure in institutional memory and learning.
Second, the negativity bias appears to challenge the role of other well-
known positive biases that act in the opposite direction, such as over-
conªdence. This apparent contradiction can be explained by the fact that
positive and negative dispositions apply in different contexts. People privilege
negative information about the external environment and other actors, but
positive information about themselves. The coexistence of these biases can
raise the odds of conºict. Decisionmakers simultaneously exaggerate the se-
verity of threats and exhibit overconªdence about their capacity to deal with
those perils—a potential recipe for disaster.
Third, the psychology literature can appear to include examples of every
conceivable bias, potentially steering people’s thoughts and behavior in dif-
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3. For two landmark reviews of the negativity bias, see Roy F. Baumeister et al., “Bad Is Stronger
Than Good,” Review of General Psychology, Vol. 5, No. 4 (December 2001), pp. 323–370, doi.org/
10.1037/1089-2680.5.4.323; and Paul Rozin and Edward B. Royzman, “Negativity Bias, Negativity
Dominance, and Contagion,” Personality and Social Psychology Review, Vol. 5, No. 4 (November
2001), pp. 296–320, doi.org/10.1207/S15327957PSPR0504_2.
ferent directions and compromising predictive power. The negativity bias,
however, combines many disparate psychological phenomena into a single
meta-bias—a fundamental disposition in the way humans think—allowing
stronger predictions about how states are likely to behave in a given context.
Despite this importance, the negativity bias has received virtually no atten-
tion in international relations. Scholars have long studied the impact of loss
aversion, but this is just one example of a much broader phenomenon where
negative factors dominate.4
The negativity bias has signiªcant implications for international relations the-
ory. For example, the negativity bias supports several features of realist theory
by helping explain why states fear each other even when information favoring
accommodation is present. However, the causal mechanism—psychological
bias—differs from the traditional realist focus on the anarchic international
system. Meanwhile, constructivists suggest that anarchy is “what states make
of it,” but the negativity bias implies that the construction of international rela-
tions is bounded rather than limitless. It would be difªcult or impossible to
construct a world where positive factors are consistently more salient than
negative factors.5
There are also implications for policymakers. The negativity bias can en-
courage threat inºation, risky gambles in the face of loss, and skewed learning
from history. Although scholars can counsel leaders to be aware of these perni-
cious effects, it is difªcult for individuals to ward off subconscious psy-
chological biases, especially meta-biases such as the negativity bias that are
driven by numerous reinforcing components. Instead, policymakers must cre-
ate decisionmaking structures and routines that block the dangerous effects
of misperceptions.
The article is divided into seven sections. The ªrst section introduces the
psychological principle that “bad is stronger than good.” The second, third,
and fourth sections assess key domains in international relations where nega-
tive phenomena predominate over positive phenomena, show how the
negativity bias provides an explanation, and identify observable implications.
The ªfth section considers sources of variation—factors that strengthen or
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4. Some work suggests that the negativity bias plays a role in political ideology and domestic poli-
tics, but the implications for international relations and global conºict remain largely unexplored.
John R. Hibbing, Kevin B. Smith, and John R. Alford, “Differences in Negativity Bias Underlie
Variations in Political Ideology,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Vol. 37, No. 3 (June 2014), pp. 297–
307, doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X13001192.
5. Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999).
weaken the negativity bias and generate predictions for when it is likely to oc-
cur. The sixth section provides a case study of Germany in World War I. The
concluding section considers the implications of our analysis for policymakers
and scholars of international relations.
Bad Is Stronger than Good: A Basic Psychological Principle
There is considerable scholarship in international relations on the role of posi-
tive bias (also known as “positive illusions,” “false optimism,” or, more collo-
quially, “overconªdence”).6 Psychologists have long shown that people tend to
inºate their perceived abilities, overestimate their control over events, and ex-
hibit overoptimism about their future prospects.7 Overconªdence can play a
major role in the outbreak of conºict, because states are more likely to ªght if
they hold an exaggerated belief in the likely beneªts of war and their odds of
victory.8 Recent work has revealed that actors are prone to overconªdence at
one particularly dangerous moment: when war appears imminent (either be-
cause the actors have committed to ªght or because conºict is perceived as
being forced on them).9
The positive bias of overconªdence has important effects, but it turns out
to be an exception to a broader trend where bad is stronger than good.
Psychologists have identiªed a powerful psychological principle known as the
“negativity bias,” which describes people’s greater sensitivity to bad phenom-
ena rather than good phenomena. Many years of diverse and independent
research in experimental psychology, now comprising hundreds of studies,
have converged around a common theme: the asymmetry of positive and neg-
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bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004); Geoffrey A. Blainey, The Causes of War (New York:
Free Press, 1973), pp. 35–56; Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conºict
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999), pp. 14–34; and Robert Jervis, Perception and
Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 356–
381.
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Pantheon, 2011).
8. Daniel Altman, “The Strategist’s Curse: A Theory of False Optimism as a Cause of War,” Secu-
rity Studies, Vol. 24, No. 2 (2015), pp. 284–315, doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2015.1038186; Blainey, The
Causes of War, pp. 35–56; Van Evera, Causes of War, pp. 14–34; Johnson, Overconªdence and War; and
Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, Causes of War (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), pp. 128–
161.
9. Dominic D.P. Johnson and Dominic Tierney, “The Rubicon Theory of War: How the Path to
Conºict Reaches the Point of No Return,” International Security, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Summer 2011),
pp. 7–40, doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00043.
ative phenomena, where negative phenomena are systematically more potent.
In a landmark review of the literature, Roy Baumeister and colleagues de-
scribed the negativity bias as “one of the most basic and far-reaching psycho-
logical principles.”10 A second major review, published in the same year, but
conducted independently by psychologists Paul Rozin and Edward Royzman,
also found the negativity bias to be a “general principle” that “holds across a
wide range of domains.”11 A large number of experimental studies have
conªrmed and replicated the phenomenon in carefully controlled laboratory
conditions, where positive and negative stimuli can be manipulated to be
identical in frequency and magnitude, and other factors ruled out. Further-
more, neuroscientists have observed the brain reacting more strongly to nega-
tive stimuli than to equivalent positive stimuli, again under experimentally
controlled conditions.12
The negativity bias is evident across a wide range of contexts. At perhaps
the most fundamental level, there are six basic emotions that are universally
displayed by all humans across cultures—happiness, surprise, disgust, sad-
ness, fear, and anger. Only one is positive, whereas four are negative (the re-
maining one, surprise, can be either).13 Other studies ªnd that stress and a lack
of social support can cause immune suppression, but positive alternatives
(such as relaxation therapies and social support) do not provide equivalent
beneªts.14 Meanwhile, phobias can arise after a single negative learning expe-
rience, but there is no comparable effect for positive experiences.15 Further-
more, among journalists and scholars of communication, “it is considered
common knowledge that bad events are more newsworthy and attract more
reader attention.”16
International Security 43:3 100
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12. Tiffany A. Ito et al., “Negative Information Weighs More Heavily on the Brain: The Negativity
Bias in Evaluative Categorizations,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 75, No. 4 (Octo-
ber 1998), pp. 887–900, doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.75.4.887; and N. Kyle Smith et al., “May I Have
Your Attention, Please: Electrocortical Responses to Positive and Negative Stimuli,”
Neuropsychologia, Vol. 41, No. 2 (2003), pp. 171–183, doi.org/10.1016/S0028-3932(02)00147-1.
13. Donald E. Brown, Human Universals (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991). Rozin and Royzman
compiled nine “major taxonomies of emotion” and found that eight out of nine of these sets of
emotions have a preponderance of negative emotions. Rozin and Royzman, “Negativity Bias,
Negativity Dominance, and Contagion,” pp. 311–312. See also James R. Averill, “On the Paucity of
Positive Emotions,” in Kirk R. Blankstein, Patrica Pliner, and Janet Polivy, eds., Advances in the
Study of Communication and Affect: Assessment and Modiªcation of Emotional Behavior, Vol. 6 (New
York: Plenum, 1980), pp. 7–45.
14. Baumeister et al., “Bad Is Stronger Than Good,” pp. 353–354.
15. Rozin and Royzman, “Negativity Bias, Negativity Dominance, and Contagion,” p. 303.
16. Baumeister et al., “Bad Is Stronger Than Good,” p. 343.
Rozin and Royzman identiªed four broad types of negativity bias: (1) “nega-
tive potency” (negative factors carry special weight); (2) steeper “negative gra-
dients” (the magnitude of negative factors increases faster than positive ones
as they approach in distance or time); (3) “negativity dominance” (when both
positive and negative factors coexist, negative factors have undue inºuence on
net assessments); and (4) “negative differentiation” (negative factors generate
more diverse and complex impacts on, and responses in, people than do posi-
tive factors).17 “Over and over,” as psychologist Jonathan Haidt summarized
this school of research, “the mind reacts to bad things more quickly, strongly
and persistently than to equivalent good things.”18
Why do people have a negativity bias? Psychologists believe that the domi-
nance of bad over good emerged as an adaptive trait to avoid lethal dangers in
human evolutionary history.19 At ªrst glance, a systematic misperception of
the world seems to be counterproductive. However, ªxating on bad things—in
both perception and behavior—is likely to have helped survival and reproduc-
tive success in ancestral environments. All organisms experience a fundamen-
tal asymmetry in which opportunities (positive events) are welcome but rarely
vital, whereas dangers (negative events) can be a matter of life and death.20
Therefore, we would expect natural selection to favor dispositions that steer
organisms away from peril.21 This is precisely what we observe. A hair-trigger
sensitivity to threat and the “ªght or ºight” response are widely evident across
all mammals as well as other taxonomic groups, and can arise in humans via
the release of adrenaline even before people fully perceive the source of the
stimulus.22 As Daniel Kahneman wrote, “By shaving a few hundredths of a
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17. Rozin and Royzman, “Negativity Bias, Negativity Dominance, and Contagion,” p. 297.
18. Tony Schwartz, “Overcoming Your Negativity Bias,” New York Times, June 14, 2013, https://
dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/06/14/overcoming-your-negativity-bias.
19. Baumeister et al., “Bad Is Stronger Than Good”; and Rozin and Royzman, “Negativity Bias,
Negativity Dominance, and Contagion.”
20. Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (London: Allen Lane, 2011), p. 301.
21. Martie G. Haselton and Daniel Nettle, “The Paranoid Optimist: An Integrative Evolutionary
Model of Cognitive Biases,” Personality and Social Psychology Review, Vol. 10, No. 1 (February 2006),
pp. 47–66, doi.org/10.1207/s15327957pspr1001_3; and Dominic D.P. Johnson et al., “The Evolution
of Error: Error Management, Cognitive Constraints, and Adaptive Decision-Making Biases,”
Trends in Ecology & Evolution, Vol. 28, No. 8 (August 2013), pp. 474–481, doi.org/10.1016/j.tree
.2013.05.014.
22. Rose McDermott, “The Feeling of Rationality: The Meaning of Neuroscientiªc Advances for
Political Science,” Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 2, No. 4 (December 2004), pp. 691–706, at pp. 692–
693, doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704040459. Rozin and Royzman identify four areas in which the
negativity bias lends adaptive advantages: balancing risks and costs (maximizing reproductive
success by prioritizing the avoidance of mortal threats), resolving informational complexity (help-
ing to select appropriate responses), increasing the speed of decisionmaking (e.g., in the face of
predators), and avoiding contagion (e.g., from disease, given that mere contact can be lethal).
second from the time needed to detect a predator, this circuit improves the ani-
mal’s odds of living long enough to reproduce.”23
How might this new scientiªc literature shape scholars’ understanding of
international relations? The negativity bias can powerfully inºuence the per-
ceptions of leaders and publics, with important consequences for state behav-
ior.24 Although psychologists may be right that the negativity bias is adaptive,
there is no reason to assume that this bias remains calibrated at the “appropri-
ate” level for human decisionmaking today, especially in the complex domain
of international relations—a completely different world compared to the an-
cestral environment in which humans evolved. Instead, the negativity bias
may serve to undermine state interests.
The negativity bias has far-reaching implications for many aspects of world
politics. Here, we focus on international security and war. The negativity bias
helps explain perceptions and behavior across three main chronological
stages of conºict: (1) threat sensitivity (how states identify opportunities and
dangers prior to conºict); (2) loss aversion (how states anticipate or experience
positive and negative outcomes during conºict); and (3) failure salience (how
states evaluate past success and failure after conºict). In the following sections,
we identify puzzling behavior in each of these areas of international relations,
show why rational choice approaches do not provide a strong explanation,
and argue that the negativity bias offers a more convincing account.
Threat Sensitivity in International Relations
The ªrst puzzling phenomenon in international relations is threat sensitivity, a
heightened reaction to negative information indicating potential dangers com-
pared to positive information suggesting opportunities. There is a consider-
able literature in international relations revealing a general tendency toward
threat inºation, but there is virtually no literature contending that a general in-
clination to underestimate threats exists. For example, Stephen Van Evera de-
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Rozin and Royzman, “Negativity Bias, Negativity Dominance, and Contagion,” p. 314. Baumeister
et al. also view the negativity bias as an adaptive trait. Baumeister et al., “Bad Is Stronger Than
Good,” pp. 325, 357–358.
23. Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, p. 301. He adds, “No comparably rapid mechanism for rec-
ognizing good news has been detected.” Ibid.
24. Laboratory experiments not only demonstrate the dominance of negative perceptions; they
also reveal the tendency toward negative behavioral responses, for example, by using reaction times
as the method of measurement. See Rozin and Royzman, “Negativity Bias, Negativity Dominance,
and Contagion,” p. 302.
scribed threat inºation as “a pervasive feature of international politics.”25
Scholars have identiªed many examples where external peril was exaggerated,
from the British obsession with the possibility of a Russian invasion of India in
the nineteenth century, to overly fearful beliefs about Soviet nuclear missile
strength in the early 1960s, to overestimates of Iraq’s WMD capabilities before
the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq.26 Instances of threat inºation may sometimes
represent “orchestrated panics” for political gain, but even this suggests that
leaders are aware of the wider public’s sensitivity to danger.27
In assessing potential threats in international relations, there appears to be
an asymmetry: negative data capture people’s attention more strongly than
positive data. For example, policymakers focus more on the possibility of a
shift in the disposition of a rival leader from benign to malign rather than the
other way around.28 Deborah Larson argued that states ªxate on signs of
threat, whereas information suggesting that a rival is behaving favorably is of-
ten ignored: “A state widely regarded as unreliable, such as the former Soviet
Union, will have to carry out many cooperative acts to convince the other side
that it can be trusted to honor an agreement. Whereas trust takes a long time to
create, it can be destroyed in an instant.”29 According to Ole Holsti’s famous
study, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was deeply committed to his view
of the Soviet Union as untrustworthy, and saw evidence that Moscow was be-
ing accommodating as an indication of Soviet weakness, justifying additional
U.S. pressure.30 Many observers in the West were also slow to trust the over-
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25. Stephen Van Evera, “Foreword,” in A. Trevor Thrall and Jane K. Cramer, eds., American Foreign
Policy and the Politics of Fear: Threat Inºation since 9/11 (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. xi; and Levy
and Thompson, Causes of War, p. 136.
26. Lawrence James, Raj: The Making and Unmaking of British India (London: St. Martin’s / Grifªn,
2000), p. 81; Jonathan Renshon, “Assessing Capabilities in International Politics: Biased Overesti-
mation and the Case of the Imaginary ‘Missile Gap,’” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 32, No. 1
(February 2009), pp. 115–147, doi.org/10.1080/01402390802407475; Kaufmann, “Threat Inºation
and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas”; and Christopher J. Fettweis, The Pathologies of Power:
Fear, Honor, Glory, and Hubris in U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013),
pp. 227–252.
27. Jane K. Cramer, National Security Panics: Threat Inºation and U.S. Foreign Policy Shifts (New
York: Routledge, forthcoming); and Jeffrey M. Cavanaugh, “From the ‘Red Juggernaut’ to Iraqi
WMD: Threat Inºation and How It Succeeds in the United States,” Political Science Quarterly,
Vol. 122, No. 4 (Winter 2007), pp. 555–584, doi.org/10.1002/j.1538-165X.2007.tb00609.x.
28. Shiping Tang, “Fear in International Politics: Two Positions,” International Studies Review,
Vol. 10, No. 3 (September 2008), pp. 451–471, doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2486.2008.00800.x.
29. Deborah Welch Larson, Anatomy of Mistrust: U.S.-Soviet Relations during the Cold War (Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 33 (italics in the original).
30. Ole R. Holsti, “The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study,” Journal of Conºict Reso-
lution, Vol. 6, No. 3 (September 1962), pp. 244–252, doi.org/10.1177/002200276200600306.
tures of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in the 1980s given the widespread
belief that Moscow would soon revert to aggressive behavior.31 Even when
leaders compare similar states within the same region and time frame—
representing a kind of controlled experiment—negative information seems to
have the advantage. During the 1970s, the United States paid more attention
to negative data suggesting a potential loss of inºuence in Ethiopia than to
positive data suggesting a gain of inºuence in Somalia.32
When perils dissipate, other ongoing dangers tend to ªll the fear vacuum,
and threat perceptions remain remarkably constant. For example, the Soviet
Union was the United States’ longtime global nemesis. It built the largest mili-
tary in the world (including tens of thousands of nuclear weapons), occupied
half of Europe, and encouraged anti-American revolutions around the globe.
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, however, did not trigger an appropri-
ate recalibration of U.S. threat perceptions. Instead, people often shifted the fo-
cus of their fears from the Soviet Union to terrorism and rogue states. One
survey in 2009 found that more than two-thirds (69 percent) of the members
of the Council on Foreign Relations thought that the United States faced a
world that was as dangerous or more dangerous than during the Cold War.33
In 2012, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Martin Dempsey,
declared the current era to be “the most dangerous time in my lifetime.”34
Terrorism was a problem in the Cold War, but few people suggested it should
be the fulcrum of U.S. foreign policy. Today, Americans worry about terrorism
in large part because of the absence of greater dangers.35
The public and the media also exhibit threat sensitivity. In an analysis of U.S.
public opinion during the Cold War, Miroslav Nincic noted that “the penalties
facing the leader found guilty of mistakenly underreacting to a Soviet threat
are far more severe than those inºicted on one whose error consists of wrongly
overreacting to that threat.”36 One study of the Israeli-Palestinian peace pro-
cess from 1995 to 2003 discovered that the “media presentation of peace and
security conditions as deteriorating has a signiªcant negative inºuence on the
public’s expectations . . . [but] . . . a presentation of an improving situation has
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31. Larson, Anatomy of Mistrust.
32. Robert Jervis, “Political Implications of Loss Aversion,” Political Psychology, Vol. 13, No. 2 (June
1992), pp. 187–204, at p. 189, doi.org/10.2307/3791678.
33. Pew Research Center, “Section 2: Global Threats and Use of Military Force” (Washington, D.C.:
Pew Research Center, December 3, 2009), http://www.people-press.org/2009/12/03/section-2-
global-threats-and-use-of-military-force/.
34. John J. Mearsheimer, “America Unhinged,” National Interest, January/February 2014, pp. 9–30,
at p. 9.
35. Robert Jervis, “Pinker the Prophet,” National Interest, November/December 2011, pp. 54–64.
36. Miroslav Nincic, “U.S. Soviet Policy and the Electoral Connection,” World Politics, Vol. 42,
No. 3 (April 1990), pp. 370–396, at p. 374, doi.org/10.2307/2010416.
an insigniªcant effect.”37 The media emphasized negative events such as “con-
ºict, threats and danger,” and thus acted as “peace spoilers.”38
What about cases where leaders neglect threats? Perhaps the most famous
example is British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain downplaying the Nazi
peril during the 1930s. Clear-cut instances of underperceiving threats are rare,
however, compared to examples of overperceiving threats. Even the arche-
typal case of Chamberlain is disputed. Some scholars argue that Britain did
see the true danger in the 1930s and appeased Adolf Hitler as a way of buy-
ing time for rearmament.39 Furthermore, appeasement was partly driven by
extreme sensitivity to the threat of German bombing. British ofªcials feared
that Germany would obliterate London in wartime and exaggerated the
likely damage from German air raids by a factor of twenty-ªve.40 Even if
Chamberlain was overly sanguine about the possibility of avoiding war, this
may have required a “perfect storm” of factors to trump threat sensitivity—for
example, erroneous intelligence, Chamberlain’s undue focus on personal en-
counters with Hitler, and the prime minister’s desperate desire to avoid an-
other world war.41 Furthermore, the incredible salience of the Chamberlain
example and the “lesson” that leaders should never appease dictators is itself
evidence of threat sensitivity.42 Being seen as underreacting to a danger is one
of the surest paths to historical opprobrium.
explaining threat sensitivity: rational choice or negativity bias?
How can threat sensitivity be explained? One potential explanation for the pri-
macy of bad over good is that states are behaving as rational actors, calculating
the costs and beneªts of available options, and their probabilities of success,
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37. Tamir Sheafer and Shira Dvir-Gvirsman, “The Spoiler Effect: Framing Attitudes and Expecta-
tions toward Peace,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 47, No. 2 (March 2010), pp. 205–215, at p. 211,
doi.org/10.1177/0022343309353110.
38. Ibid., p. 211.
39. A.J.P. Taylor described British policy during the Munich crisis as “a triumph.” Taylor, The Ori-
gins of the Second World War (London: Penguin, 1964), p. 9.
40. Robert Jervis, “Deterrence and Perception,” International Security, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Winter 1982/
83), pp. 3–30, pp. 14–18, doi.org/10.2307/2538549; Gerald Geunwook Lee, “‘I See Dead People’:
Air-Raid Phobia and Britain’s Behavior in the Munich Crisis,” Security Studies, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Win-
ter 2003/04), pp. 230–272, doi.org/10.1080/09636410490521208; and Stephen Budiansky, Air
Power: The Men, Machines, and Ideas That Revolutionized War, from Kitty Hawk to Gulf War II (New
York: Viking, 2004).
41. Dominic D.P. Johnson, Strategic Instincts: The Adaptive Advantages of Psychological Biases in Inter-
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and then selecting the policy that is expected to produce the highest utility.43
Threat sensitivity could be an optimum strategy to maximize security in a dan-
gerous world. After all, in an anarchic self-help system, the cost of ignoring
threats may exceed the cost of inºating threats. If so, it could be rational to err
on the side of caution by deliberately overweighting negative information. In
decisionmaking, this is known as “error management theory,” where actors
follow a strategy that, over time, aims to minimize the chance of making the
worst possible error (for example, setting a ªre alarm to be “too sensitive,” so
that it might sometimes go off when the toast is burned but never misses a
genuine ªre).44
Larson and others, however, have argued that rational choice is not a good
explanation of threat inºation because the sensitivity to danger is so strong
that it tends to undermine state interests.45 Exaggerated concerns about poten-
tial threats can lead to arms races, conºict spirals, and missed opportunities for
reconciliation.46 A rationalist explanation for threat sensitivity also has a high
burden of evidence, because it requires that actors consciously decide to in-
ºate perils as the optimum strategy in anarchy. In the archival record, there-
fore, we would expect to ªnd that decisionmakers systematically choose to
prioritize bad over good, but little or no such evidence has emerged.47
If rational choice does not provide a convincing explanation for threat sensi-
tivity, what does? One compelling answer is the negativity bias. Prioritizing
peril over opportunity is precisely what we would predict given the funda-
mental psychological tendency to search for negative information, ªxate on
potential dangers, and overweight their magnitude. In one series of studies,
for example, negative images elicited more attention and neural activity than
(otherwise similar) positive images.48 In another experimental paradigm, sub-
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jects were able to locate a lone angry face in a grid of happy faces more quickly
than they were able to locate a lone happy face in a grid of angry faces—
a “pop-out” effect in which people were drawn to information that signaled
potential danger.49
Negative data also dominate positive data in the assessments of other actors.
The study of impression formation in psychology has identiªed a “positive-
negative asymmetry effect,” where bad information about people is weighted
more heavily in evaluations than good information.50 When subjects were
asked how many lives a murderer would need to save—on separate occa-
sions, always putting his own life at risk—to be forgiven for his crime, the me-
dian answer was twenty-ªve.51 Another study discovered that perceived
character weaknesses were more important than perceived character strengths
in shaping evaluations of political candidates.52 Accordingly, the key to suc-
cessful relationships can be to decrease negative behaviors, rather than to in-
crease positive behaviors.53 Another consequence is that good reputations are
hard to acquire but easy to lose, whereas bad reputations are easy to gain
and hard to shed.54
Evidence from neuroscience suggests that positive and negative information
are processed in different parts of the brain, and the unconscious mind is espe-
cially sensitive to threats.55 Both animals and humans have rapid vigilance sys-
tems or “preconscious danger detectors that size up their environment very
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quickly.”56 Negative information is received by the sensory thalamus and sent
directly to the amygdala (the brain’s “threat center”), which can trigger a fear
response even before the information enters conscious awareness. For exam-
ple, experiments reveal intense responses in the amygdala to threatening im-
ages, even when they are shown so fast (hundredths of a second) that they are
not even recognized by the observer.57 The effects can also be long-lasting. Expo-
sure to threats releases adrenaline and noradrenaline in the brain, and over sub-
sequent months, “any stimulus similar to those experienced in the original
trauma—even harmless ones—can trigger an exaggerated stress response in the
amygdala.”58 Psychologist Timothy Wilson suggests that what he calls people’s
“adaptive unconscious” may have evolved precisely “to be a sentry for negative
events in our environment.”59 Heightened responses to threatening information
are to some extent beyond people’s control or even recognition.
implications of threat sensitivity for international relations
If the negativity bias underlies threat sensitivity, what are the implications
for international relations? Leaders ªxate on negative behaviors, see their
rivals (and often allies) in an overly harsh light, and miss opportunities
for cooperation—potentially triggering crises, escalation, or war. Van Evera
describes threat inºation as “an important cause of international conºict.”60
Jack Levy and William Thompson ªnd that “exaggeration of the hostility of
the adversary’s intentions is a particularly common pattern in the processes
leading to war.”61 Even if actors have access to information suggesting that the
rival is open to an acceptable settlement, conºict may not be averted in favor
of a deal, because all sides will overweight data indicating threat without nec-
essarily being consciously aware of the bias.
Threat sensitivity contributes to the security dilemma, where defensive
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actions intended to enhance security, such as military spending, can inspire
distrust, produce arms races, and provoke a spiral into war, even among states
with compatible interests.62 The overweighting of negative information means
that it is difªcult to avoid the security dilemma through policies of restraint.
For example, the Soviet Union reduced its conventional forces in the 1950s
and 1960s, but this did not lead Washington to reappraise Moscow’s motives
more favorably.63
Loss Aversion in International Relations
A second important domain in international relations where bad is stronger
than good is loss aversion: people are more sensitive to losses than gains
and are willing to gamble to avoid a forfeit. Loss aversion has been widely
used by scholars to explain empirical phenomena in international relations.64
What has not always been recognized, however, is that loss aversion is just one
example of a much broader pattern in which negative information trumps pos-
itive information.
In a famous series of experiments, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky
examined decisionmaking when people faced alternatives that involve risk.
Subjects choosing between positive payoffs (a “domain of gains”) are gener-
ally cautious and risk averse. By contrast, subjects choosing between negative
options (a “domain of losses”) tend to be risk acceptant and willing to gamble
rather than consent to even a small loss. These ªndings led to the creation of
prospect theory as an alternative to rational choice theory.65
Bad World 109
62. Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Janu-
ary 1978), pp. 167–174, doi.org/10.2307/2009958; and Shiping Tang, “The Security Dilemma: A
Conceptual Analysis,” Security Studies, Vol. 18, No. 3 (2009), pp. 587–623, doi.org/10.1080/
09636410903133050.
63. Evan Braden Montgomery, “Breaking Out of the Security Dilemma: Realism, Reassurance, and
the Problem of Uncertainty,” International Security, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Fall 2006), pp. 151–185, doi.org/
10.1162/isec.2006.31.2.151.
64. Robert Jervis, “Political Implications of Loss Aversion,” in Barbara Farnham, ed., Avoiding
Losses, Taking Risks, Prospect Theory and International Conºict (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 1994); Jack S. Levy, “Applications of Prospect Theory to Political Science,” Synthese, Vol. 135,
No. 2 (May 2003), pp. 215–241; Jack S. Levy, “Loss Aversion, Framing Effects, and International
Conºict,” in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed., Handbook of War Studies II (Ann Arbor: University of Michi-
gan Press, 2000), pp. 193–221; Rose McDermott, “Prospect Theory in Political Science: Gains and
Losses from the First Decade,” Political Psychology, Vol. 25, No. 2 (April 2004), pp. 289–312,
doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2004.00372.x; and Jonathan Mercer, “Prospect Theory and Political
Science,” Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 8 (June 2005), pp. 1–21, doi.org/10.1146/annurev
.polisci.8.082103.104911.
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One result of loss aversion is the “endowment effect,” where people de-
mand more money to give up something they already own (a loss) than they
will pay to receive an identical item (a gain).66 Another consequence of loss
aversion is the tendency to focus on sunk costs. Rather than basing decisions
on the future outlays and beneªts associated with alternative options, people
seek to regain or make up for past expenditures through redoubled commit-
ment, potentially entrapping them into further losses.67 Furthermore, people
go to great lengths to eliminate the risk of loss entirely. For example, people are
willing to pay more to reduce the risk of loss from, say, 0.5 percent to 0 percent,
than to reduce the risk of loss from 1 percent to 0.5 percent, even though the
magnitude of reduction is the same.68
In the realm of international relations, leaders are more willing to make
“painful” choices, or difªcult policy changes, to avert impending losses rather
than to achieve equivalent gains.69 Great powers are also averse to accepting
even relatively minor losses in wartime, and instead gamble by persevering
in costly conºicts.70 For example, following President Lyndon Johnson’s deci-
sion to commit to a major military intervention in Vietnam in 1965, U.S. costs
increased, and Washington entered the domain of losses. But rather than wind
down the war effort, American ofªcials gambled through escalation in a des-
perate bid to avoid the loss of South Vietnam.71 Scholars have also used loss
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aversion to explain the Japanese decision to attack the United States in 1941,
U.S. and Soviet behavior during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, and U.S. ac-
tions in the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979–81.72 The phenomenon appears to be
widely evident in society as well. Nincic found that U.S. public and congres-
sional support for the use of force tends to be higher when the operation is
designed to prevent a loss rather than to produce a gain.73
explaining loss aversion: rational choice or negativity bias?
It is difªcult to provide a rationalist explanation for loss aversion in interna-
tional relations. If states are maximizing utility, why gamble in the face of loss
but not in the face of equivalent gains? Indeed, the behavioral economics liter-
ature has explicitly demonstrated that loss aversion violates the expectations
of rational choice theory and produces suboptimal decisions both in controlled
laboratory conditions and in the ªeld.74 So why does it arise?
The negativity bias can provide an explanation. Losses feel worse than fore-
gone gains, because negative information and events loom larger. The effect
appears to be a fundamental cognitive feature across species.75 For example,
both animals and humans ªght harder over territory they already possess than
over territory they desire.76 Far from perception and behavior approximating
the rational actor model, studies have found that it takes damage to the brain
to eradicate people’s natural loss aversion.77 Although scholars have long
studied loss aversion in behavioral economics and international relations, it is
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actually just one manifestation of the larger, and neglected, phenomenon of the
negativity bias. Indeed, Rozin and Royzman identiªed loss aversion as a clas-
sic instance of the negativity bias: bad information has greater potency than
equivalent good information.78
implications of loss aversion for international relations
A psychological bias toward loss aversion can be harmful in international rela-
tions by making it more difªcult to resolve conºicts or exit from deteriorating
wars. Once actors ªnd themselves in the domain of losses, they become risk
acceptant, encouraging reckless decisionmaking and the escalation of costly
military campaigns.79 Valuing what one gives up more than similar conces-
sions by the opponent can also undermine negotiations to end a war.80 Jeffrey
Taliaferro found that great powers persevered in failing conºicts to the detri-
ment of their interests and far longer than a rational cost-beneªt analysis
would predict.81 “The commonest error in politics,” noted the British states-
man Lord Salisbury, “is sticking to the carcasses of dead policies.”82
Failure Salience in International Relations
A third puzzling phenomenon in international relations is the tendency to
remember and learn more from perceived negative outcomes than from per-
ceived positive outcomes, which we term “failure salience.”83 Learning refers
to “a change of beliefs, the degree of conªdence in one’s beliefs, or skills as a
result of the observation and interpretation of experience.”84 Levy found that
bad outcomes are a more profound source of learning than are good outcomes.
Failures that were unexpected at the time and thus came as a shock are espe-
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cially powerful, but “predictable failures are still more likely to lead to learn-
ing than are successes.”85
For example, one of the major ways that leaders learn from the past is by
drawing historical analogies, or “an inference that if two or more events sepa-
rated in time agree in one respect, then they may also agree in another.”86
Analogies provide guidance for policymaking by clarifying the strategic and
moral stakes in a crisis and the likely success of different options. Strikingly,
decisionmakers are far more likely to draw analogies to past debacles than
they are to triumphs. Ernest May published a classic work on analogical think-
ing, but did not distinguish between positive and negative analogies. By our
tally, the book includes 105 instances of decisionmakers drawing historical
parallels. In 87 cases (or 83 percent), decisionmakers referred to past failures as
warnings to avoid, whereas in just 18 cases (or 17 percent), they referred to
past successes as models to emulate.87
Major policy failures can deªne a historical period. Michael Roskin divided
recent U.S. history into a series of eras, where foreign policy was shaped by the
memory of a particular historical event: the isolationist “Versailles paradigm”
of the 1920s and 1930; the interventionist “Pearl Harbor paradigm” of the early
Cold War; and the noninterventionist “Vietnam paradigm” of the 1970s. All of
these paradigms are based on avoiding a repetition of past failure. The non-
interventionists of the interwar period and the 1970s, for example, did not cel-
ebrate other eras of U.S. restraint. Instead, they criticized the perceived
debacles of World War I and Vietnam.88
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Failure is more likely than success to induce signiªcant policy change.
Organizations are often resistant to reform except after major loss.89 One study
found that U.S. security policy since 1945 underwent substantial change only
after disasters in intelligence, deterrence, or war.90 Similarly, according to
Michael Horowitz, states that win wars tend to be relatively conservative in
subsequent strategic thinking, whereas states that lose tend to adopt major
military innovations.91
explaining failure salience: rational choice or negativity bias?
There is no obvious rationalist explanation for why people should learn more
from bad outcomes than from good outcomes or draw analogies with past di-
sasters rather than triumphs. Rationally, leaders ought to take both prior suc-
cesses and failures into account in their future policy choices.92 Failure salience
can be explained, however, by the negativity bias. Baumeister and colleagues
noted that “bad things will produce larger, more consistent, more multi-
faceted, or more lasting effects than good things.”93 Experts have long
observed that memories of failure are processed in more thorough and com-
plex ways than are memories of success. In 1757, David Hume observed:
“Prosperity is easily received as our due, and few questions are asked concern-
ing its cause or author . . . On the other hand, every disastrous accident alarms
us, and sets us on enquiries concerning the principles whence it arose.”94
Studies show that negative events are recalled more easily than positive
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events, are processed more intensely, lead to more extensive causal reasoning,
and become the basis for learning and reºection. After betting on sporting
events, for example, subjects spent more time analyzing their failed bets than
they did analyzing their successful bets.95 Negative events are also more likely
than positive events to make people search for a responsible agent, rather than
attributing the outcome to luck or the environment.96 In experimental games
where people either cooperated or cheated, subjects recalled cheaters’ faces
more accurately.97 Negative events such as accidents also tend to have a more
enduring impact than do positive occurrences such as winning the lottery.98
Psychologists have described so-called ºashbulb memories, in which particu-
larly dramatic (and often traumatic) events are burned into memory and more
easily recalled thereafter.99
Neuroscience helps to explain why this happens. As noted above, negative
and positive events are dealt with differently at the neurological level.
Psychologist Jeffrey Alan Gray described how the brain’s “behavioral ap-
proach system” (motivating engagement) deals with positive stimuli, whereas
the “behavioral inhibition system” (motivating avoidance) deals with negative
stimuli, including threat and, crucially, learning. Indeed, all mammals (includ-
ing humans) learn more rapidly and effectively from negative experiences
than from positive ones.100 Rats that eat poisoned food once will never touch
that food source again (“traumatic avoidance learning”).101 In humans too,
neuronal connections and neuron ªring patterns are permanently altered
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when a negative stimulus is encountered, such that “fear-inducing events
leave indelible memory traces in the brain.”102
implications of failure salience for international relations
If the negativity bias underpins failure salience, what does this imply for inter-
national relations? The dominance of past negative experiences could poten-
tially be useful in countering other kinds of policy biases and facilitating
necessary reform. Governments and militaries are often slow to respond to
changing environments, because people tend to view information in ways that
ªt existing predispositions, and organizations may have vested interests in
maintaining the status quo. Failure salience can help actors break through
these barriers and encourage experimentation and adaptation.103
The problem is that failure salience can also produce skewed learning and
policy errors. May argued that leaders typically employ historical analogies
badly, failing to “analyze the case, test its ªtness, or even ask in what ways it
might be misleading.”104 Failure salience may be a contributing factor. Leaders
do not consider the full range of relevant historical examples, but instead pri-
oritize negative experiences. Decisionmakers neglect how policies that were
mistaken overall might still have succeeded in certain aspects (which are
worth replicating), or, alternatively, how past successes offer teachable mo-
ments, by providing an overarching model to copy or warnings about speciªc
dimensions of the approach that failed. In assessing policies of appeasement,
for example, actors tend to ªxate on a single instance of failure from the
1930s—the Munich crisis.105 As a result, states may overlearn from bad events.
Memories of the ill-fated U.S. mission in Somalia in 1992–94, for example, were
a primary reason why the United States was reluctant to intervene to stop the
Rwandan genocide in 1994.106
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Summary: Observable Implications of the Negativity Bias
The salience of bad over good is evident in at least three important areas in in-
ternational relations: threat sensitivity, loss aversion, and failure salience.
None of these three phenomena is consistent with the predictions of rational
choice, because the powerful and systemic overweighting of negative informa-
tion tends to diminish utility. And even if these biases were somehow advanta-
geous, there is little evidence that leaders consciously choose to prioritize bad
over good as a strategy. Instead, hundreds of studies suggest that the salience
of negative information results from a subconscious psychological bias (and
the neurological mechanisms underlying it), with important implications for
international relations (see table 1).
Sources of Variation: When Does the Negativity Bias Arise?
Baumeister and colleagues identify the negativity bias as a fundamental prin-
ciple of psychology that affects most people most of the time. Despite the au-
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Table 1. Observable Implications of Positive Bias (Overconªdence) and the Negativity
Bias (Threat Sensitivity, Loss Aversion, and Failure Salience) for Public and Leaders’
Perceptions and State Behavior
Observable Implications For:
Domain Perceptions (of leaders and publics) Behavior (of states)
Overconªdence Actors maintain positive illusions
about their capabilities, control of the
environment, and future prospects.
States are more likely to
initiate war.
Threat sensitivity Actors search for and overweight
negative information about other
actors; when threats dissipate, other
dangers ªll the fear vacuum.
States overreact to threats,
triggering the security
dilemma, arms races, crises,
and war.
Loss aversion Actors are overly sensitive to losses
and give undue attention to sunk
costs.
When facing losses, states
are risk acceptant and more
likely to challenge an
opponent, choose to ªght, or
escalate a failing military
campaign.
Failure salience Actors dwell more intensely on
memories of failure than on success
and learn more from past disasters
than from triumphs.
Failure is more likely than
success to produce a change
in policy or military doctrine.
thors’ efforts to ªnd contrary instances where good is stronger than bad, there
were “hardly any exceptions,” and psychologists “may have overlooked
the extent of [the rule’s] generality.”107 Nevertheless, the extent to which the
negativity bias is expressed can vary among individuals and contexts.108 For
example, one study found that although 83 percent of subjects were loss
averse, a minority showed no bias, and a handful actually displayed the re-
verse tendency and placed a higher value on gains and disregarded the risk
of loss.109
What determines the strength of the negativity bias in a given actor or con-
text? Here, we emphasize three important sources of variation (see ªgure 1):
(1) the target of assessment (which alters whether the bias is positive or nega-
tive); (2) the tide of information (which alters whether any bias is present); and
(3) timing, ideology, and agency (which alter the speciªc magnitude of threat
sensitivity, loss aversion, and failure salience). These sources of variation help
explain why behaviors in international relations arising from the negativity
bias occur under certain conditions and not others.
target of assessment
First and most obviously, how do we reconcile the negativity bias with the
well-established positive bias of overconªdence? It may seem contradictory
that people can simultaneously prioritize bad over good, and good over bad.
Given the prominence of threat sensitivity, loss aversion, and failure salience,
we might expect people to be racked by a lack of conªdence. But people never-
theless exhibit positive illusions about their own attributes, degree of control
over events, and probable future success.
This paradox can be resolved because of a key source of variation: negative
and positive biases operate in different domains (the third column in ªgure 1,
“target”). When people survey the world around them and other actors, nega-
tive information and events loom large (a bias in other-perception). But when
people assess themselves and their own capabilities, they are prone to over-
conªdence (a bias in self-perception).110 For example, in the case of failure sa-
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110. Baumeister et al. contrast the negativity bias in “forming impressions” of others (pp. 344–348)
lience, memories tend to be negatively biased. However, memories of the self’s
role in events tend to be positively biased, as people highlight their own per-
sonal contribution to successes and downplay their role in failures, leading to
egoistic or hagiographic autobiographies.111 Each bias is potentially adaptive:
the negativity bias makes people alert to potential threats in their environ-
ment, whereas positive bias helps people strive harder to overcome dangers
when they arise.
Interestingly, the cognitive mechanisms engaged to achieve positive biases
speciªcally target the extraordinary salience of negative factors. The reason
people are able to maintain positive biases is because human brains have pow-
erful ways of deºecting negative information.112 People preserve their opti-
mism by underestimating their chances of experiencing bad events more than
by overestimating their chances of experiencing good events.113 Therefore, the
speciªc processes by which positive biases operate are, counterintuitively, evi-
dence of the wider dominance of negative phenomena.
tide of information
If negative bias dominates in other-perception, and positive bias dominates in
self-perception, why are actors sometimes able to assess things accurately?
After all, states sometimes overcome their suspicions and make peace, and
leaders sometimes conclude that a war would end badly and decline to ªght.
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One simple but important answer is that negative and positive biases can
be trumped by a tide of countervailing information (the second column in ªg-
ure 1, “information”). Given sufªcient evidence, for example, even a distrust-
ful decisionmaker may see a rival as cooperative. The problem is that the
salience of negative factors is of such high magnitude—negative information is
four or ªve times stronger than positive information in some studies—that the
incoming positive data may need to be vast in scale to compensate and pro-
duce accuracy. As Baumeister and colleagues put it, “Good can only match or
overcome bad by strength of numbers.”114
When are leaders likely to receive sufªcient accurate information to out-
weigh these biases? Regime type is one important variable. In democracies, the
existence of a free press, greater policy debate, institutional checks and bal-
ances, and more actors involved in decisionmaking raises the chances that an
array of information can counteract positive and negative biases.115 By con-
trast, in autocratic regimes, where leaders are surrounded by “yes men” and
do not have effective (or any) opposition parties or parliaments to challenge
them, there is less opportunity for biases to be corrected than there is in
democracies.116 Dictators are therefore more likely than their democratic
counterparts to be overly fearful, loss averse, sensitive to historical failures,
and overconªdent. For example, in his 2001 book, Sumit Ganguly found that
both India and Pakistan were overconªdent about ªghting each other. How-
ever, positive biases were accentuated by the authoritarian regime in Pakistan,
and somewhat suppressed by the free-wheeling democratic debate in India.117
A similar logic applies to negative biases, where democratic states allow for
greater information ºows that challenge ºawed assumptions.
timing, ideology, and agency
The above sources of variation affect the presence, direction, and magnitude
of the negativity bias in general. Additional sources of variation explain the
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Figure 1. Model of How Negativity Bias Varies in Strength.
NOTE: The negativity bias is pervasive but varies with (1) the tide of information; (2) the tar-
get of assessment; and (3) the timing, ideology, and agency associated with speciªc mani-
festations of the negativity bias. When there is overwhelming accurate information, we
expect no bias (white boxes). When assessments are of the self, we expect positive bias
(black boxes), and when assessments are of others or of the environment, we expect the
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source of variation
strength of the negativity bias in speciªc domains: threat sensitivity, loss aver-
sion, and failure salience (the fourth column in ªgure 1, “outcomes”).
variation in threat sensitivity. A key variable shaping the strength of
threat sensitivity is temporal proximity. Rozin and Royzman found that nega-
tive events gain disproportionate salience as they approach in distance or time
(compared to positive events). For example, in one experiment, people evalu-
ated an event with both positive and negative aspects that was to occur to-
morrow and in a month’s time. Although the material characteristics were
identical, the imminent event was rated as more negative.118 This ªnding sug-
gests that the sensitivity to threats in international relations will become even
stronger at a particularly dangerous moment: when war looms. Interestingly,
the perception that conºict is imminent also boosts overconªdence.119 As a re-
sult, at a critical time, when peace hangs in the balance, perceptions of the
other become more fearful and perceptions of the self become more optimistic,
a toxic mix that is likely to heighten the odds of war.
Threat sensitivity is also increased among people with a conservative ideol-
ogy, as opposed to those with a liberal ideology.120 For example, conservatives
show greater attention to threatening stimuli than do liberals.121 When view-
ing ambiguous facial expressions, conservatives are also more likely to see a
threat or anger, whereas liberals are more likely to see other traits such as sur-
prise.122 In the United States, Republicans are more likely than Democrats to
view other countries as enemies.123
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A third variable that heightens threat sensitivity is human agency. People
pay particular attention to dangers that are deliberate and can be attributed to
a speciªc protagonist, such as a state or a terrorist group, rather than to face-
less threats, such as global warming. People are also more likely to attribute
negative events, rather than positive events, to a human agent.124 Psycholo-
gists suggest that the human brain evolved to prioritize purposeful threats be-
cause they were more likely to reoccur. As Daniel Gilbert explained, “It is bad
to be harmed, but it is worse to be victimized.”125 In one experiment, for exam-
ple, subjects claimed that electric shocks were more painful if they were delib-
erately administered by a human agent.126
variation in loss aversion. Actors exhibit heightened loss aversion
when they are perceived to be personally at fault for a failure—for example,
because they launched a war that ultimately proved costly, or they were in
ofªce when a negative event occurred (e.g., being the victim of a surprise at-
tack). Barry Staw showed in his classic article, “Knee-Deep in the Big Muddy,”
that people who are individually responsible for negative outcomes are more
likely to commit additional resources to a course of action that proves costly
(e.g., President Johnson in Vietnam).127 Elites are particularly resistant to com-
promising and making peace if they personally decided to initiate a military
campaign, which explains why a leadership change is often necessary to end a
war. Loss aversion may be especially strong in personalist dictatorships, where
a single individual is clearly responsible for the decision to wage war. In de-
mocracies and “machine” non-democracies (with a collective civilian leader-
ship such as that in China after Mao Zedong), responsibility may be diffused,
and therefore loss aversion may be less pronounced.128
variation in failure salience. Failure salience is heightened when nega-
tive events are recent.129 This is partly a consequence of the “availability heu-
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ristic,” in which people’s judgment and decisionmaking are unduly inºuenced
by recent salient experiences (rather than all experiences).130 Therefore, the last
big failure tends to dominate memory and learning and “block out the sun.”
For example, during the interwar period, the United States’ involvement in
World War I was widely perceived by elites and the public as a debacle,
powerfully shaping U.S. foreign policy in the 1920s and 1930s. But after 1945,
a new failure emerged in historical memory: the error of isolationism
and appeasement. As a result, the Great War was largely forgotten. Even
whenVietnam triggered the reemergence of noninterventionist attitudes, and
heightened the apparent relevance of World War I, the U.S. experience in
1917–18 was rarely discussed.131
Weltpolitische Angst: The Negativity Bias and World War I
In this section, we explore the utility of the negativity bias with a case study of
Germany in World War I. The case is a plausibility probe designed to show
that the argument is sufªciently grounded in the evidence to justify further re-
search and additional testing.132 We aim to demonstrate that all three major
manifestations of the negativity bias (threat sensitivity, loss aversion, and fail-
ure salience) operated as predicted in a single example: before, during, and af-
ter the ªghting.
Why is Germany in World War I a good case to consider? First, Germany
was arguably the most signiªcant actor in the origins of World War I, and
some scholars have recently renewed the argument that Berlin deliberately
provoked the conºict.133 Germany played an even more important role in the
origins of World War II, in part because of the salience of its failure in the Great
War. Second, the case offers considerable within-case variation, allowing us to
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rule out explanations based on the propensities of a given party, leader, or
strategy. Third, World War I is a paradigmatic example for the development of
international relations theories, including the security dilemma and the spiral
model of war, and therefore applying the negativity bias in this case may have
particular value for existing frameworks.
Fourth, we can explain outstanding puzzles in German behavior. Many
scholars have identiªed the role of false optimism in the great powers’ deci-
sions to ªght in World War I, escalate, and resist a negotiated solution, but neg-
ative biases were actually more common in key domains.134 In his best-selling
history of the origins of the war, The Sleepwalkers, Christopher Clark wondered:
“How did the sense of fearfulness and foreboding that one ªnds in so many of
the sources connect with the arrogance and swaggering we encounter—often
in the very same individuals?”135 This is precisely the combination of behav-
iors predicted by the interplay of positive and negative biases. Furthermore,
when scholars note the impact of negative biases during World War I, they
usually highlight a single dynamic such as heightened sensitivity to peril or
sunk costs.136 By contrast, our goal is to show that the negativity bias pervaded
perceptions of the entire war, from start to ªnish (and long after it ended).
There are a variety of challenges in examining the negativity bias. For a start,
how do biases demonstrated in a laboratory setting translate to group deci-
sionmaking at the political level? Here, there is little reason to believe that cog-
nitive regularities found in study populations are absent in political elites.137 If
anything, biases are likely to be more pronounced during times of stress, emo-
tion, and fast-moving and high-stakes decisionmaking, when people’s intu-
itions come to the fore and there is less opportunity for cold calculation.138 It is
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also not easy to demonstrate in a historical case that bad was stronger than
good in the assessment of information and events. In laboratory experiments,
these factors can be made equivalent and other variables ruled out. In histori-
cal analyses, however, one has to judge how positive or negative decision-
makers at the time “ought” to have been, given the available information. This
is a challenge but not an insurmountable barrier to investigation. During
World War I, a wealth of evidence shows that German leaders reacted to infor-
mation asymmetrically, when both bad and good information were present.
In the case, we compare positive bias and negative bias to a rational actor
model as our null hypothesis. As Levy and Thompson explained, “The ratio-
nal model is both a normative model of how decisions ought to be made as
well as a parsimonious explanatory model of how decisions actually are made,
and for these reasons the rational model is generally taken as the standard
against which other models are compared.”139 If the rationalist explanation
holds true, we would expect to see (1a) actors do not privilege negative over
positive information, or (1b) if they do, it is a conscious strategy to maximize
utility in the prevailing environment. If the negativity bias holds true, we
would expect to see (2a) actors privilege negative over positive information,
and (2b) they do so without any mindful choice or discussion, implying a bias
at the subconscious level.
overconªdence in world war i
Many scholars have found signiªcant positive bias, or overconªdence, on all
sides prior to the outbreak of World War I.140 Overconªdence also tended to in-
crease as war approached.141 In early August 1914, the Bavarian envoy to
Berlin reported: “One can say today that Germany and Austria will be op-
posed by the whole world in the impending war. Nonetheless, the mood in the
military circle here is one of complete conªdence.”142 Meanwhile, Chancellor
Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg predicted “a war lasting three, or at the
most, four months . . . a violent, but short storm.”143 Exaggerated optimism in-
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ºuenced Berlin’s military planning, and there was remarkably little prepara-
tion for a long campaign.144 The positive bias of German overconªdence was,
however, an exception to a wider pattern of negative bias, where actors high-
lighted potential threats, current or anticipated losses, and past failures.
threat sensitivity in world war i
Threat sensitivity suggests the following observable implications: (1) actors
search for negative information, downplay positive information, and over-
weight bad information about other actors in evaluations; (2) when threats dis-
sipate, other dangers ªll the fear vacuum; (3) domestic audiences overreact to
threats and reward their emphasis by leaders; and (4) threat inºation increases
the likelihood and intensity of conºict.
Many scholars have argued that before World War I, Germany displayed an
extreme sensitivity to threat. Max Hastings concluded that “paranoia was a
prominent feature of the German psyche at this period—a belief that the coun-
try’s strategic position, far from progressively strengthening, was being weak-
ened by the rise of socialism at home and the Entente’s military capabilities
abroad.”145 As Jonathan Steinberg put it, “The normal techniques of historical
analysis must grind to a halt before this German weltpolitische Angst.”146
German perceptions of French and Russian rearmament illustrate how
policymakers in Berlin systematically privileged negative information. During
1913–14, France and Russia initiated major rearmament bills. The French gov-
ernment increased the duration of mandatory military service from two to
three years. In June 1914, Russia introduced the “Great Program,” which was
designed to enhance the size of its army by 40 percent by 1917.147 German
leaders saw these (and other) measures as a grave threat, and many key of-
ªcials contended that the only solution was preventive war. In January 1914,
Helmuth von Moltke, chief of the German General Staff, stated: “The war
readiness of Russia has made tremendous progress since the Russo-Japanese
War and has today reached a degree as never before.”148 In March, he urged an
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immediate war because, otherwise, within two or three years, “the military su-
periority of our enemies would be so great then that he did not know how we
might cope with them.”149
By 1913, the kaiser believed that Germany faced a racial showdown between
Teuton and Slav: “The Slavic race is caught up in an expansionist fever.”150 In
June 1914, according to German banker Max Warburg, the kaiser was “op-
pressed by his worries” over Russian rearmament and openly contemplated a
preventive war.151 The kaiser declared that France and Russia had aggressive
intentions: “Whoever in Germany still does not believe that Russo-Gaul is
working with urgency towards an imminent war against us, and that we must
take countermeasures accordingly, deserves to be sent straightaway to the
madhouse at Dalldorf!”152
Were these threat perceptions rational? It is true that the Dual Alliance had
only 61 percent of the gross national product of the Entente and that Russia
had grown economically more quickly than Germany since 1890. Furthermore,
the German Schlieffen Plan called for an initial assault against France followed
by a campaign against the slower mobilizing Russians. St. Petersburg’s rear-
mament and the development of new railways in the western Russian prov-
inces might enable a rapid Russian mobilization that would undermine the
entire scheme.
German ofªcials systematically overweighted negative information, how-
ever, suggesting an important role for psychological bias. Holger Herwig ar-
gued that German beliefs cannot be attributed to poor intelligence, but instead
resulted from the lens through which this information was viewed.153
First, Berlin highlighted negative data indicating that France and Russia had
predatory, as opposed to security-seeking, intentions. German leaders as-
sumed that France and Russia would unite against Germany in a future war
even though these states had repeatedly failed to back each other in crises be-
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fore 1914—a record of coalitional friction that potentially threatened the future
of the Entente.154 Herwig noted that German statesmen “perceived their own
alternatives always as restricted by necessity or ‘fate,’” whereas France and
Russia were “embarrassed by a plethora of open choices.”155 Berlin displayed
little empathy for the strategic challenges faced by Paris and St. Petersburg
and underestimated the degree to which France and Russia were reacting to
German moves. Ironically, it was Berlin’s own aggressive military strategy that
drove its opponents into each other’s arms.156 French and Russian rearmament
was a direct response to the German army bill of 1913, which contained
the biggest military increase in German history and added 117,000 men to the
peacetime army. One Social Democratic Party (SPD) deputy in the Reichstag
recognized that “without our army bill France would not have dreamt of intro-
ducing the three-years’ service bill.”157 On April 7, 1913, French President
Raymond Poincaré wrote in his diary: “Bethmann Hollweg has been the best
architect of the Three Year Law.”158 German rearmament also spurred Russian
defense spending.159 It is notable, however, that rather than desperately pre-
paring for a war of aggression, St. Petersburg rearmed with considerable delay
and laxity, and the Russian Duma backed the Great Program only in June 1914,
a year after Germany began bolstering its military.
Second, ofªcials in Berlin exaggerated the capabilities of a future enemy co-
alition. German leaders were highly pessimistic about the outlook if war was
delayed beyond 1914. It was assumed that Germany would be surrounded by
hostile actors and Russia would be on a glide path to military primacy.160 A
fair assessment of Berlin’s security environment, however, would have con-
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cluded that there were—at minimum—signiªcant opportunities as well as
dangers. Germany had a dynamic and growing economy and was protected
by the strongest army and the second most powerful navy in the world.
By 1913, Germany’s population (66.9 million) far surpassed that of France
(39.7 million), and a greater percentage of Germany’s population was urban-
ized (21 percent versus 14.8 percent in France). Admittedly, Russia had a
higher population (175.1 million), but only 7 percent of Russians lived in urban
areas. In 1913, Germany produced more steel (17.6 million tons) than Britain,
France, and Russia combined (17.1 million tons).161 The assumption that high
Russian growth rates would continue inexorably was questionable given do-
mestic divisions inside Russia continue other development challenges.162
Indeed, A.J.P. Taylor concluded that “peace would have brought Germany the
mastery of Europe within a few years.”163
Third, ofªcials in Berlin did not consider whether security threats could be
ameliorated by a shift in strategy. One option was a policy of détente to break
up the opposing coalition. Berlin might have learned from the British experi-
ence following the 1899–1902 Boer War, when London overcame its diplomatic
isolation by settling Anglo-American boundary disputes, forming a new alli-
ance with Japan, and building the Entente with France. Another alternative
was to abandon the Schlieffen Plan and switch to a defensive posture on the
Western Front combined with restricted offensives on the Eastern Front, with
the goal of avoiding British intervention and achieving a limited victory and a
negotiated peace (as championed by Helmuth von Moltke the Elder in the
1880s).164 Such options were rarely explored, however. Moltke the Younger re-
sponded to Russian and French rearmament by demanding more troops and
matériel for the desired preventive war.165
One apparent exception to German threat sensitivity is the belief among
some ofªcials in Berlin that Britain would not enter the war. For example, dur-
ing the July crisis, Bethmann hoped that London would stay neutral.166 This is
not a clear example of a state underestimating external peril, however. Al-
though some German ofªcials were unsure about British intentions, French
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ofªcials were also uncertain about whether Britain would ªght.167 Both coun-
tries were right to be cautious, because British ofªcials themselves doubted
whether London would enter the fray. The Anglo-French Entente Cordiale of
1904 was not a binding alliance but instead an attempt to solve outstanding
strategic issues. The British Liberal Party prime minister, Herbert Asquith,
wrote on July 24, 1914, that “we are within measurable, or imaginable, dis-
tance of a real Armageddon.”168 Britain could maintain its splendid isolation
from the apocalypse, however: “Happily there seems to be no reason why we
should be anything more than spectators.”169 On August 2, the prime minister
thought that three-quarters of his own party in Parliament favored neutral-
ity.170 London decided to ªght very late in the crisis, between August 2 and
August 4, partly because of the German invasion of Belgium, and also because
of a wider calculation that British geopolitical interests required participating
in a struggle that could reshape the map of Europe.171
In addition, many key decisionmakers in Berlin were highly sensitive to the
British danger, including hardened Anglophobes such as Prussian Minister of
War Erich von Falkenhayn; head of the German navy, Adm. Alfred von
Tirpitz; as well as the kaiser, who believed that London and Paris conspired to
prevent Germany from attaining its rightful place in the sun.172 For a decade
before 1914, the German General Staff assumed that if war broke out in the
West, Britain would ªght alongside France.173 On July 27, Kurt Riezler,
Bethmann’s chief adviser, noted in his diary that Britain would back Russia to
avoid a rift in the Entente: “The reports all point to war . . . England’s language
has changed.”174
loss aversion in world war i
The negativity bias suggests that leaders will be sensitive to loss, with the fol-
lowing observable implications: (1) actors in the domain of gains are risk
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averse; and (2) actors in the domain of losses are risk acceptant and liable to
gamble rather than accept even a modest forfeit—for example, by escalating
military campaigns despite the danger to national interests.
Once the Great War was under way, Berlin exhibited signiªcant loss aver-
sion and an acute awareness of sunk costs. Given the military stalemate and
the catastrophic costs in lives and resources, as well as the unraveling of the
social fabric at home, the great powers’ interests arguably favored a negotiated
peace as early as 1915. Why, therefore, was the war so difªcult to resolve?
Germany (and indeed all the great powers) were averse to any peace that did
not deliver a clear gain. Leaders in Berlin often focused on the fact of loss
rather than on the magnitude of loss. Any negative outcome was intolerable.
In February 1918, German general Erich Ludendorff stated: “If Germany
makes peace without proªt, then Germany has lost the war.”175 Hein Goemans
and Mark Fey described how German leaders feared that even a peace based
on a return to the status quo ante bellum would lead to domestic revolution: “An
outcome which failed to reward the people for their sacriªces would threaten
not only their power and privileges but their very lives.”176 Here, a cynic
might suggest that escalation was rational behavior from the perspective of in-
dividual political survival; but even if that is the case, it suggests that wider
German society was loss averse.
The greater the sacriªce in blood and treasure, the greater the required
war dividend. In 1916, German leaders realized the situation was worsening
but responded by increasing rather than diminishing their war aims, seeking
huge war indemnities, a vast empire of annexed territory and puppet states
stretching from Antwerp to Ukraine, as well as a sweeping new colony in cen-
tral Africa.
By this stage of the war, Berlin believed that the current path would likely
lead to defeat. Having entered the domain of losses, the regime was attracted
to risky gambles that promised to win it all back, even with the potential for
disaster. In 1917, the decision to launch unrestricted submarine warfare was
exceptionally dangerous, because it was likely to provoke U.S. intervention (as
in fact occurred). Bethmann called it a “leap in the dark.”177 Pursuing the exist-
ing path, however, was expected to end in defeat and Berlin placed its bet.
Similarly, in 1918, Germany had the option of switching to a defensive strategy
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and seeking a negotiated peace, but this was not seriously considered. Instead,
Berlin gambled everything on a huge all-or-nothing assault, the Spring
Offensive. The strategy may not have been rational from the perspective of
maximizing utility, because the costs were potentially catastrophic, but the
“high risk, high reward” offensive was deemed to offer the best—and perhaps
the only—chance of getting a better than even outcome. Ultimately, the offen-
sive caused 700,000 German casualties and sped up Berlin’s defeat.178
failure salience in world war i
Failure salience implies two key observable implications: (1) actors will dwell
on memories of failure more intensely than on memories of success and learn
more from past disasters than from triumphs; and (2) failure is more likely
than success to trigger policy change—for example, shifts in military doctrine.
During the 1920s, the British and the French had complex memories of the
Great War, and many people wondered if it had been a Pyrrhic victory. Never-
theless, it was assumed that Britain and France were on the winning side and
Germany was on the losing side.179 In the victor countries, according to David
Stevenson, “public interest centered not on the war’s termination but on its
origins.”180 Britain and France subsequently engaged in limited military re-
form, and adopted a defensive posture based on the expectation that a future
European conºict would essentially be a repeat of the Great War. Even by 1939,
Britain did not have a single armored division. France had plenty of tanks but
lacked an effective doctrine of mobile warfare and relied on the ill-fated
Maginot Line of ªxed defenses.181
By contrast, as the losing party, Germany exhibited a striking degree of fail-
ure salience. Postwar German politics focused intensely on the military deba-
cle: “In the defeated countries after 1918 the search for explanation became
obsessive.”182 Germany displayed a far greater willingness than the victorious
Allies to learn lessons about what went wrong and adapt its military. Immedi-
ately after World War I ended, several hundred ofªcers in the Germany army
engaged in a root-and-branch analysis of the lessons of the conºict. Rejecting
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the simple “stab in the back” myth, which blamed the defeat on domestic
forces, the German General Staff focused on the poor execution of the
Schlieffen Plan and the failed battle of Verdun. A special Reichstag committee
produced eight volumes of documents on the German collapse in 1918 that
highlighted numerous strategic errors.
During the 1920s and 1930s, Germany sought to avoid a prolonged stale-
mate in future conºicts by creating a new military doctrine.183 According to
Barry Posen, the German army’s efforts to improve its capacity at offensive
warfare are “best explained by the organization’s failure in World War I, and
its desire to avoid a repetition of that failure.”184 Berlin did not instantly es-
chew trench warfare and develop the blitzkrieg strategy. For one thing, the
Treaty of Versailles limited the German army to 100,000 men and prohibited
the operation of a single tank. Therefore, the initial priority was to work out
how to defend the fatherland with a minuscule force. Furthermore, once offen-
sive options became conceivable, Berlin sought a return to pre–World War I
doctrines, which sought to destroy the enemy through encirclement and envel-
opment.185 At times, there was also institutional resistance to innovation. Nev-
ertheless, under Hitler, the German military eventually embraced a model of
mechanized warfare that combined tanks, radios, and aircraft, based, above
all, on avoiding “a repetition of the World War I, multi-front, attrition experi-
ence.”186 The German battleªeld victories of 1939–41 can be traced, at least in
part, to the commitment to learning lessons from the Great War: “The interwar
German military explored and disseminated these lessons diligently, ºexibly,
and with receptivity to new ideas.”187
sources of variation in world war i
In summary, Germany exhibited threat sensitivity, loss aversion, and failure
salience. These phenomena can be explained more readily by the negativity
bias than by rational calculation. In addition, variation in positive and nega-
tive biases broadly followed the expected pattern.
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target of assessment. As predicted, positive and negative biases were ev-
ident in different domains, reconciling the literature on overconªdence prior to
World War I with the broader negativity bias. German ofªcials highlighted
negative information about the external environment and often saw the moti-
vations of rival states in the worst light. But when German leaders assessed
their own capabilities and the odds of victory in an imminent war, they tended
to be overconªdent, focusing on promising trends, such as France’s budgetary
problems and lack of manpower. Herwig captured this duality: “Ridden with
anxiety, guilt, fear, and paranoia, yet at the same time dominated by a remark-
able egoism, German statesmen and soldiers by the second decade of the
twentieth century could see escape from their predicament only in a mad
‘bolt.’”188 For example, Moltke exhibited negative illusions about Germany’s
enemies, including his belief in an inevitable racial war with the Slavs, as well
as positive illusions about Germany’s capabilities and its military superiority
in a near-term conºict. Annika Mombauer wrote that he “painted a picture
that was at different times either so gloomy as to suggest that only a war now
could save Germany from a fate that would inevitably lead to her defeat in the
future, or so overconªdent that it led the civilian statesmen to assume that
they could undertake an aggressive foreign policy that was backed up by a
seemingly invincible military force.”189
The coexistence of positive and negative biases created tensions and incon-
sistencies, which were often unexplored or unreconciled. As foreign threats
were perceived to grow, one might expect that conªdence in victory would
drop proportionately. But oftentimes, the leaders who felt most threatened
were also the most optimistic. German leaders who highlighted promising op-
portunities for war today rarely considered whether similar dynamics might
operate in the future, diminishing the Franco-Russian threat. Similarly, of-
ªcials who emphasized external peril did not abandon their hopes of mili-
tary success in a near-term war. For example, Moltke was prone to see grave
dangers in the geopolitics of Europe; but although he recognized that a war
could be long and costly, he resisted the possibility of military defeat.190 For-
eign Minister Gottlieb von Jagow later claimed that Moltke’s conªdence had
“inspired” him in the July crisis.191
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tide of information. Germany’s undemocratic regime exacerbated the
presence of all biases, both positive and negative. Compared to decisionma-
king in Britain and France, decisionmaking in Berlin during the Great War was
characterized by less civilian control and open debate. The German General
Staff ran the campaign, and civilian leaders largely deferred to military elites.
According to Isabel Hull, “Both the British and French armies displayed a live-
lier sense of their limitations: they could conceive of losing a battle, they
did not underestimate their enemy.”192 Elected ofªcials had limited sway in
Germany, with “excessive inºuence for formidable technicians consumed by
hubris, inadequately restrained by politicians whose judgements, if also
deªcient, were generally superior.”193 Moltke helped to develop a system that
gave primacy to military authority, meaning that leaders in Berlin subscribed
to “frightening images of an uncertain future” while also believing that
“Germany was still superior to her enemies at present.”194
timing, ideology, and agency. Speciªc domains of the negativity bias also
varied in predictable ways, based on proximity in time, ideology, and agency.
For example, there is suggestive evidence that German leaders became excep-
tionally threat sensitive as the danger drew closer in July 1914. As information
emerged about the perceived French and Russian menace toward the end of
the July crisis, the kaiser became paralyzed by dread. Greg Cashman and
Leonard Robinson described the kaiser’s mind-set on July 29: “His normal
cognitive functions impaired, he appeared to have been overcome with a
mood of despair and aggression and fatalism. His response to [Tsar] Nicholas’s
note verged on the paranoid: Drawing on his long-held perception of a
Germany encircled by hostile powers and his ambivalent love-hate relation-
ship with Britain, he concluded that there was a British, Russian and French
conspiracy to keep Germany negotiating while the Entente powers mobilized
for an attack on Germany.”195
There is also a correlation between conservative ideology and heightened
threat sensitivity. The Reichstag of 1914 featured numerous parties includ-
ing the left-wing SPD, the Catholic Center Party, and several conservative par-
ties. The conservative parties were consistently more fearful of France and
Russia and the threat of encirclement. During the July crisis, dozens of people
were arrested in Berlin for singing socialist songs and opposing war. As
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Hastings wrote, “The right-wing press had a ªeld day the next morning, de-
nouncing the demonstrators as ‘a mob’, and anti-war protesters as traitors.”196
Of course, this indicates relative threat sensitivity: many on the German left
were worried about the danger posed by tsarist autocracy.197 As one liberal
journalist wrote on July 26, “We cannot allow Austria to go under, for then we
should ourselves be threatened with becoming subject to the greater Russian
colossus, with its barbarism.”198
Actions attributable to human agency tend to be seen as a greater threat than
impersonal or environmental threats. In 1914, Germany’s predicament was
rarely considered to be an accident of its geopolitical location, or a tragic con-
sequence of European arms races, or uneven economic development. Rather,
the problem was the predatory intentions of Russia, France, and Britain.
Richard Ned Lebow wrote that “[Kaiser] Wilhelm chose instead to escape from
his own aggressiveness and its consequences by portraying Germany and
himself as helpless victims of the aggressive designs of other powers.”199
In terms of loss aversion, German leaders who were personally responsible
for military failure were exceptionally opposed to accepting loss and particu-
larly attracted to the alternative of gambling. At the start of the war, the
German military command did not have speciªc territorial aims, but by 1917 it
had embraced highly ambitious goals.200 During the Spring Offensive in 1918,
General Ludendorff constantly pushed for riskier attacks in the search for a de-
cisive encirclement. Meanwhile, he refused to accept evidence of loss. One
close observer described Ludendorff’s “terrible inner battle in which one saw
the catastrophe, on the one hand, but on the other could not and did not want
to understand it.”201
By contrast, Bethmann did not make the key decisions during the war, and
as we would predict, he was more skeptical about escalatory strategies such as
unrestricted submarine warfare, and he was more willing to contemplate a
compromise peace.202 Similarly, the SPD, Center Party, and liberal parties in
the Reichstag were largely ignored on military policy, and in 1917, these
groups endorsed a “Peace Resolution” that called for no annexations or in-
demnities. Younger members of the military command and recent appointees
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were also less responsible for prior failures and more willing to argue for a de-
fensive strategy and a negotiated peace. Hull wrote that “critical realism could
sprout where military culture was weakest.”203 In 1918, the military high com-
mand sought a ªnal battle, or Endkampf, and “had to be stopped by external in-
tervention, from the cabinet, the Reichstag, and popular revolt.”204
Failure salience also followed the expected pattern. The Great War, as the
most recent debacle, completely dominated historical learning in Germany
during the 1920s and 1930s. Older historical events, whether positive or nega-
tive, were largely ignored, as Berlin became ªxated on avoiding a repeat of the
defeat in 1918.
Conclusion
The negativity bias is a core feature of international relations that helps explain
many puzzling behaviors, including the sensitivity to threatening information,
the tendency to gamble in the face of loss, and the inclination to learn from
failures more than successes. Some of these perceptions and associated behav-
iors are individually familiar to political scientists. But rather than being inde-
pendent dynamics, each is part of a broader phenomenon in which bad is
stronger than good. The story of global politics is therefore one of negative bias
more than positive bias, and overconªdence is an exception to a wider pattern.
At the same time, there are several important sources of variation—most
notably, that self-perception (e.g., assessing one’s own capabilities) fosters pos-
itive bias, whereas other-perception (e.g., assessing foreign states) fosters nega-
tive bias.
The rational actor model is unable to provide a convincing explanation for
threat sensitivity, loss aversion, and failure salience. All of these perceptions
and associated behaviors tend to run counter to state interests. In addition, we
ªnd little evidence that leaders adopt a biased assessment as a deliberate strat-
egy. Instead, extensive psychological studies suggest that these phenomena are
predictable manifestations of biases in judgment and decisionmaking. It may
sometimes be beneªcial for states to ªxate on negative information—for exam-
ple, in a highly dangerous environment. There is no reason to believe, how-
ever, that human behavioral dispositions are correctly “calibrated” to the
modern political environment, which is almost unrecognizable from the small-
scale kin groups in which people evolved. In the very different world of to-
day’s international relations, the negativity bias can be catastrophic.
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World War I originated, was prosecuted, and was recalled, under a pall
of negativity. German decisionmakers sometimes exhibited overconªdence
when they assessed their capabilities and the odds of success. But when of-
ªcials looked outward at the external environment, negative biases predomi-
nated. Threat sensitivity motivated Berlin to ªght; loss aversion encouraged
Germany to escalate; failure salience meant that defeat in the Great War be-
came a fundamental source of learning.
One avenue for further research is to explore potential interactions between
the three domains of negative bias (threat sensitivity, loss aversion, and failure
salience), and the positive bias of overconªdence. The relationship between
threat sensitivity and overconªdence may be especially important in causing
war. The coexistence of negative images of others and positive images of one-
self means that actors perceive a dangerous world and yet overestimate their
ability to navigate it, heightening the odds of conºict. According to Thomas
Ricks, before the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, the George W. Bush administra-
tion was guilty of “simultaneously ‘worst-casing’ the threat presented by Iraq
while ‘best-casing’ the subsequent cost and difªculty of occupying the coun-
try.”205 The power of this interaction is reinforced when war draws near, be-
cause leaders become even more threat sensitive and overconªdent.
What are the implications of the negativity bias for international relations
theory? The bias provides some support for realism. For example, the ten-
dency to highlight negative data helps explain why states balance against
threats by forming alliances and building up military capabilities, and why
uncertainty about other states’ intentions and the security dilemma are en-
demic features of the international system.206 The negativity bias deviates from
neorealism, however, because it explains these dynamics in terms of human
psychology rather than the anarchic international system.207 Meanwhile, the
negativity bias provides a challenge for constructivism, because it implies that
perceptions are not simply a cultural creation. Instead, leaders and publics are
systematically inclined to prioritize bad over good.208
What are the policy implications? First, decisionmakers must be aware of
the dangers of the negativity bias, especially exaggerating threats, gambling
in the domain of losses, and learning from an overly narrow sample of analo-
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gies, which can lead to poor strategy and avoidable conºict. For example, the
United States is likely to overstate the threat of a rising China and overestimate
its ability to resolve this threat. It is difªcult for leaders to resist subconscious
psychological biases, particularly a profound meta-bias such as the negativity
bias. Therefore, ofªcials may need to create new decisionmaking structures to
ward off dangerous errors—for example, by appointing a formal “devil’s ad-
vocate” to challenge the prevailing wisdom (or perhaps, more accurately, an
“angel’s advocate” who reminds people that perceived threats are often exag-
gerated, losses can be absorbed, and successes are a useful source of learning).
Second, leaders should recognize that opponents will exhibit these traits,
whether or not they themselves avoid them. If leaders assume that opponents
are rational actors, who weigh positive and negative information evenhand-
edly, strategic analysis will be ºawed.
Third, diplomacy is like marriage: many positive interactions are needed
to balance out a perceived sleight and create an enduring special relation-
ship. Negative interactions should be avoided even if the cost of forbearance
is substantial.
Fourth, leaders can take advantage of the negativity bias. For example, dra-
matic shifts in policy may be easier to achieve when the public perceives a
threat, when it is in a domain of loss and subsequently becomes risk acceptant,
or when it recalls past failure. This is true of escalatory strategies and rallying
support for war, but it could also apply to tough but necessary dovish policies,
such as giving up land for peace. A bad world can lead to a better world.
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